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The European Commission’s proposal to impose what was referred to as an
“export ban” on exports of COVID-19 vaccines and active substances used in
those vaccines has generated considerable political and social media comment,
particularly from the United Kingdom, perceived to be the target of the measure
(though, for once, the current UK government has, at least to date, not chosen to
pour oil on this particular fire). 
The background is, of course, the slow progress of vaccination against COVID-19
in the EU compared to progress in the United Kingdom (and in the US and Israel).
  There are a number of reasons for that, including different public health systems,
the unfounded invocation of the precautionary principle by senior EU politicians
as to the safety and efficacy of the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine, as well as slower
approval of vaccines by the European Medicines Agency compared to the UK
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) – the MHRA
having managed to approve vaccines even during the transitional period, while
the United Kingdom was still subject to EU law, by using Member States’ power
in Article 5(2) of the Medicines Directive to approve, outside the EU medicines
regime, medicinal products for use in relation to pathogens.  Since the current UK
government is generally seen as having dealt rather more incompetently with the
pandemic than most EU states – a view borne out by the higher UK death rate – the
United Kingdom’s marked success in this aspect of the response to the pandemic
has, perhaps, been particularly galling.
One aspect of the UK success that has generated a lot of heat but somewhat less
light, largely because many relevant facts remain unclear, is the extent to which
the UK government managed to obtain rather better contractual terms of supply
from AstraZeneca than did the European Commission. One aspect of this is that the
UK government invested substantial sums very early on in the development of the
Oxford vaccine, and appears to have been responsible for the choice of AstraZeneca
as the pharmaceutical company partner, as well as providing large and early
investment, including commitments to pay a relatively high price for the vaccines.
  In possible contrast, the contract between AstraZeneca and the Commission – a
redacted version of which has been published – seems to have involved only a “best
endeavours” commitment from AstraZeneca.  In any event, the Commission appears
to have been somewhat disappointed by the amounts that AstraZeneca has been
able or prepared to supply under that contract, and AstraZeneca’s conduct in relation
to that contract has not attracted universal approbation from EU politicians. 
The Commission’s “export ban” takes the form of a supplement to Commission
Implementing Regulation 2021/442.  The original Regulation applied to all
exports of COVID vaccines and active ingredients to countries other than various
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listed countries (the listed countries being various states and territories in the
neighbourhood of the EU, including Israel and various others, but not including the
United Kingdom).  Such exports to non-listed countries needed export authorisation,
but such authorisation should be given except where export “poses a threat to
the execution of APAs [advance purchase agreements] concluded by the Union
with vaccine manufacturers, in view of the volume of exports or any other relevant
circumstances” (see Article 1(7)).  The supplementary Regulation covers exports to
all territories outside the customs union (apart from microstates and territories such
as Ceuta), and, more importantly for the United Kingdom, extends the grounds on
which export authorisation must be refused to include cases where the exports “pose
a threat to the security of supply within the Union of [COVID vaccines and active
ingredients]” (Article 2(1)).  The Regulation goes on to provide (Article 2(2)) that that
latter condition involves assessment: (i) of the extent to which the destination state
“restricts its own exports to the Union of [COVID vaccines and active ingredients], or
of the raw materials from which they are made, either by law or by any other means,
including through the conclusion of contractual arrangements with the manufacturers
of those goods”; and (ii) of “the relevant conditions prevailing in [the destination
state], including the epidemiological situation, the vaccination rate and the existing
availability of [COVID vaccines and active ingredients]”.
The so-called “export ban” is therefore more accurately seen as a power to refuse
export authorisation in cases where it is considered that export poses a threat to
EU supplies, taking account of the extent to which the destination state restricts its
own exports and of the vaccination situation in that state.  The wide framing of the
conditions permits considerable discretion: and, in the case of the United Kingdom,
the reference to “contractual conditions” is designed to cover the case where the
destination state does not need to impose any export restrictions because it has, in
effect, bought up its entire manufacturing capacity (though note also that the United
Kingdom apparently supplies key ingredients of the Pfizer vaccine manufactured
in the EU, so to that extent factor (i) cuts both ways in its case, again leaving what
would appear to be considerable discretion in the hands of the EU authorities).
In response, some rather over-excited legal commentary in the United Kingdom
accused the EU of “confiscating private property” in “breach of the rule of law”.  The
claim that the supplementary Regulation “confiscates private property” is hard to
square with what that Regulation actually does: a restriction on export is not normally
regarded as a confiscation.  As to the claim of breach of the rule of law, it is evidently
not sustainable (at least outside the world imagined by Robert Nozick) to argue that
any interference with contractual or ownership rights amounts to a breach of the
rule of law.  Rather, the contention of breach seems to turn on the claim that what
the Commission was doing was evading the courts by obtaining by other means
what should have been the benefit of winning a (disputed) contractual claim against
AstraZeneca.  That latter contention is, however, also unsustainable.  An example
illustrates the point.  Assume I own (in the United Kingdom) a Gainsborough
painting.  I decide I want to sell that painting to the Getty Museum in California.  The
UK Government immediately imposes an export ban on cultural heritage grounds. 
No plausible violation of the rule of law (such powers are, of course, routine).  Would
it make any difference that the UK government also had a plausible claim to a court
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order that I must sell the Gainsborough to the National Gallery (say, because I had
promised in a way that was arguably binding as a matter of English contract law to
sell the painting to that institution)? It is hard to see why it would, even if the end
result of the ban was that I decided to give up my flirtation with the Getty Museum
and sell the painting to the National Gallery (which would have been the result of a
successful contract claim against me).  If the general power exists and is consistent
with the rule of law, it is hard to see why the use of that power contravenes the rule
of law simply because the state might also have had a contractual way of achieving
the same end.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the supplementary Regulation necessarily
infringes any international legal rule.  Article XX GATT provides a wide gateway for
export bans where necessary to protect human health, though (given the width of
the discretion given by the Regulation there might be a good argument that the ban,
or its application in practice, gave rise to “arbitrary and unjustified discrimination”
contrary to the chapeau to that Article).  An export restriction will engage Article 1 of
Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, but the interference would
seem relatively straightforward to justify, at least if the restriction is consistently
applied. 
That said, the fact that the supplementary Regulation is (probably) lawful as a
matter of international law (and is certainly not a breach of the rule of law) does
not mean that it is wise.  The EU’s citizens have trading interests throughout the
world.  Many of those interests are ultimately reliant on the conduct of the state
concerned: if the state concerned decides to exercise its powers in ways that cut
across the contractual rights of EU citizens, those citizens will be the losers.  Using
the EU’s power in this way is a bit like pulling a brick from the tower in the well-
known game of Jenga: the risk is that what is already a somewhat rickety tower
(the rules-based trading order) will wobble yet further.  More immediately, the risk of
vaccine nationalism is that other states will retaliate in a negative-sum game. 
That line may be open to the criticism that the EU is simply responding to more
subtle vaccine nationalism by (among others) the United Kingdom – more subtle
because the end of vaccine nationalism (priority supplies for itself) has been
achieved not by public law bans but by better and more enforceable private law
contracts, and by careful and early investment in manufacturing capacity.  However,
the difficulty with that line of argument is that, precisely because public law bans are
public and obvious, they are more likely to trigger retaliation and, in the end, more
likely to do long-term harm to the international trading system.  By taking this step,
the EU may have wandered into the part of the map labelled “Here Be Dragons”. 
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